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A LIMITED ROLE FOR THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
RESPONDING TO MATERNAL SUBSTANCE
ABUSE DURING PREGNANCY
JOHN E.B. MYERS*
A tiny premature baby cries inconsolably from the hospital
crib which is its only home. The infant is a "boarder baby,"
one of the increasing number of infants abandoned at birth by
addicted parents whose craving for crack cocaine is so powerful
that it shatters the bond between parent and child.' As many as
300,000 infants are born annually to American women who use
crack cocaine during pregnancy.2 An additional 10,000 chil-
dren are born each year to women using opiates.3
With as many as one child in ten affected by maternal drug
use during pregnancy,4 the social implications of the problem
are staggering. Everyone agrees that society must respond, but
few agree on what should be done. In particular, there is con-
troversy over whether the legal system can play a constructive
role in the response to maternal drug use. This article begins
with discussion of criminal prosecution of women whose drug
use during pregnancy harms their child. Although a defensible
argument can be made for prosecution, I conclude that utiliza-
tion of the criminal justice system is likely to do more harm
than good. Rejecting prosecution as a viable alternative, I turn
to the juvenile court. Although the juvenile court cannot solve
the problem of maternal drug use during pregnancy, a revital-
ized and reoriented juvenile court can play a positive and
meaningful role. Before the juvenile court can achieve this
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law,
Sacramento, California.
1. See Fomufod & Street, Rearing Children in Hospital Facilities, 85
PEDIATRICS 137 (1990) ("A telephone survey of Washington, D.C. area
hospitals in June 1989 was conducted using the term 'boarder' babies, and
there were 41 such infants reported in six hospitals").
2. Bays, Substance Abuse and Child Abuse: The Impact of Addiction on the
Child, 37 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 881 (1990).
3. Bays, supra note 2.
4. See National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and
Education, A First: National Hospital Incidence Survey (1989). See also In re Troy
D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 872 (1989) ("It has been
estimated that I I percent of children born in United States hospitals are born
having been exposed to dangerous drugs and are consequently at risk").
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goal, however, significant and controversial changes must
occur. I conclude the article with a proposal to return the juve-
nile court to its roots at the beginning of this century, to a time
when the court was not so highly governed by the adversary
system of decision-making.
I. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Should women whose drug use during pregnancy harms
their child be prosecuted? A number of legislators5 and prose-
cutors think so.6 For example, in July 1989, a Florida woman
was convicted of delivering cocaine through the umbilical cord
to her newborn infant.7 Charles Condon, the Circuit Solicitor
for Charleston County, South Carolina has instituted a pro-
gram under which pregnant women on drugs are informed that
unless they submit to drug treatment, they may be prosecuted.8
The primary goal of the program is-to induce women to get off
drugs and into treatment. In 1986, criminal charges were
brought against a California woman who ignored a doctor's
advice to refrain from sexual intercourse and drugs during
pregnancy. The woman's child was born with brain damage,
and died within two months. The case did not proceed to trial,
however, because a judge ruled the woman could not be
charged under the statute relied on by the prosecutor.9 In
5. STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITrEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND
FAMILIES, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., HEARING SUMMARY: LAW AND POLICY
AFFECTING ADDICTED WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN (1990) [hereinafter
HEARING SUMMARY]. The Hearing Summary reports that Kary L. Moss, Staff
Attorney, Women's Rights Project of the ACLU, testified that legislation to
make drug use during pregnancy a crime has been introduced in Ohio,
Georgia, Louisiana, and Rhode Island.
6. See Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
278, 285 (1990). ("In Colorado, prosecutors have charged pregnant drug
addicts with felony use of a controlled substance and misdemeanor child
abuse. Women have also been arrested in Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Ohio.") (footnotes omitted). See also HEARING
SUMMARY, supra note 5, which notes testimony that at least 50 women have
been charged with crimes based on drug or alcohol use during pregnancy.
7. State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA, (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989),
appeal docketed, No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1989).
8. See Condon, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy: A Description of
the Interagency Policy in Charleston County, South Carolina (unpublished
paper available from J. Myers).
For a highly critical perspective of the South Carolina program and other
efforts to prosecute women for drug use during pregnancy, see Partlow, When
Becoming Pregnant is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41 (1990).
9. For discussion of this case see Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs:
The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REV. 994,
994-95 (1988) [hereinafter Maternal Rights].
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1989, a Massachusetts woman whose baby was born with
metabolites of cocaine in its urine was indicted for distributing
cocaine to a minor. The indictment was dismissed by the trial
court on statutory and constitutional grounds.'0 In 1987, an
Ohio woman gave birth to a cocaine affected baby. The woman
was indicted under a statute punishing child endangerment.
The trial judge dismissed the indictment, and the Ohio Court
of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion." In 1989, an
Illinois grand jury refused to indict a woman whom the prose-
cutor charged with involuntary manslaughter and supplying
drugs to a minor. The infant, who tested positive for cocaine,
died two days after birth.12 Although prosecutorial efforts
remain isolated occurrences, prosecutors feel mounting pres-
sure to act.
13
To appreciate the policy and legal implications of prosecu-
tion, it is useful to examine the issue from two distinct,
although overlapping, perspectives. American criminal law is
grounded in Western moral philosophy; therefore, I begin the
discussion of prosecution by drawing on the literature of moral
philosophy, particularly the work of Joel Feinberg. Following
the analysis from moral philosophy, the discussion shifts to
principles of constitutional law. Although it is artificial and not
always possible to separate the moral from the constitutional
debate, the separation is useful. Legislators and other policy
makers grappling with the policy implications of maternal drug
use during pregnancy need information from the moral per-
spective as much as, if not more than, information on the con-
stitutional permissibility of prosecution.
A. An Analysis from Moral Philosophy
A responsible moral argument can be constructed for lim-
ited prosecution of women whose drug use during pregnancy
harms their unborn child.' 4 The proponent of prosecution
10. Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Sup. Ct. Crim. Act. Mass.
Oct. 15, 1990).
11. State v. Gray, No. L-89-239 (Ohio App. Ct. Aug. 31, 1990).
12. Marcotte, Crime & Pregnancy: Prosecutors, New Drug Laws, Torts Pit
Mom Against Baby, 75 A.B.A. J. 14 (1989).
13. Logi, Drugs in the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs, 9
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23 (1990).
14. For commentary regarding prosecution see Berrien, Pregnancy and
Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal Use of Punitive Measures, 2 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 239 (1990); Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983) (supporting prosecution);
Moss, supra note 6 (arguing against prosecution); Kleinig, Criminal Liability for
Fetal Endangerment, 9 CRIM.JUST. ETHICS 11 (1990); Maternal Rights, supra note
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does well to admit at the outset that criminalization limits
women's liberty insofar as it restricts what women may do dur-
ing pregnancy. The proponent of prosecution must overcome
what Feinberg calls a
'presumption in favor of liberty' requiring that whenever
a legislator is faced with a choice between imposing a
legal duty on citizens or leaving them at liberty, other
things being equal, he should leave individuals free to
make their own choices. Liberty should be the norm;
coercion always needs some special justification.' 5
In view of the fundamental importance of liberty and the
stinging social stigma associated with criminal conviction, the
presumption in favor of liberty is heavy indeed.
To overcome the presumption favoring liberty, those
favoring prosecution of women using drugs during pregnancy
turn to principles which justify coercion through law. The
most cogent of these "liberty-limiting principles" is the "harm
to others principle," which empowers society to prohibit its
members from seriously harming one another.' 6 John Stuart
Mill described the "harm principle" in On Liberty, where he
wrote that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others."' 7 Feinberg reminds us that it is often "legiti-
9 (opposing prosecution); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood" Feminist Theory and
State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325 (1990) (arguing against
prosecution); Note, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During Pregnancy: A
Decisionmaking Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J. 357 (1989).
15. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 9 (1984).
16. See id. at 26-27, for a summation of the liberty-limiting principles.
17. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 1, para. 9 (1859). Mill overstated the case
when he asserted that preventing individuals from harming each other is the
"sole" and "only" justification for restraint on liberty. As Feinberg points
out, Mill acknowledged another "liberty-limiting principle." Feinberg writes
that "Mill often wrote as if prevention of private harm is the sole valid ground
for state coercion, but this must not have been his considered intention." J.
FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 25 (1973) (emphasis in original). Mill
acknowledged that certain acts that could not be prohibited under the "harm
principle" are nevertheless legitimately proscribed. Mill wrote that "there
are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves,
ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation
of good manners and, coming thus within the category of offenses against
others, may rightly be prohibited." J. MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. 5, para. 7
(1859). Feinberg writes that Mill came upon "the offense to others" principle
"as a kind of afterthought .. " J. FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 14.
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mate for the state to prohibit conduct that causes serious pri-
vate harm, or the unreasonable risk of such harm. .... 18
Maternal drug use during pregnancy risks the type of physical
and mental injury which, in ordinary circumstances, invokes the
harm principle. The difficulty with maternal drug use during
pregnancy is that it is not the ordinary circumstance.
Opponents of prosecution may assert that the harm princi-
ple has no application to drug use during pregnancy because
the fetus is not a "person" who can be harmed. They point to
Roe v. Wade,' 9 in which the Supreme Court ruled that an
unborn child is not a "person" as that term is defined in the
Fourteenth Amendment.2" It seems disingenuous, however, to
suggest that an unborn child cannot be damaged within the
contemplation of the harm principle. A fetus may not be a
Fourteenth Amendment "person," but neither is it a moral
nonentity.2 ' Whatever uncertainty surrounds the legal status
of the unborn child, it cannot be denied that the unborn child
has the potential to inherit the full mantle of moral and legal
personhood, and this potential should not be ignored. Indeed,
the most ardent critics of prosecution agree that a pregnant
woman has at least a moral responsibility to refrain from need-
less harm to her unborn child.2 2 To assert that a woman owes
no moral obligation to her unborn child would lead to what
Phillip Johnson calls the "monstrous moral conclusion" that a
woman could, without scruple, engage in behavior designed to
rob her unborn child of the opportunity for a meaningful life.23
Focusing on the child, it is difficult to discern a moral dis-
tinction between administering crack or cocaine to a nine-
18. J. FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 11.
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. Id. at 158.
21. See Kalafut v. Gruver, 239 Va. 278, 389 S.E.2d 681 (1990). In
Kalafut, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that a tortfeasor could be liable for
damage to a fetus later born alive. The court wrote:
When a child is born alive, the argument that an unborn child is
not a "person" misses the point. "There is no question that
conception sets in motion biological processes which if undisturbed
will produce what every one will concede to be a person in being. If
in the meanwhile those processes can be disrupted resulting in harm
to the child when born, it is immaterial whether before birth the
child is considered a person in being....
While a fetus is not a "person," it is not a nonentity.
389 S.E.2d at 685.
22. See Johnson, A New Threat to Pregnant Women's Autonomy, 17 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 33 (1987).
23. Johnson, The ACLU Philosophy and the Right to Abuse the Unborn, 9
CRIM. JUST. ETHics 48, 50 (1990).
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month-old infant and giving the same drug to a nine-month-
old fetus. The consequences may well be the same for both
children, a lifetime of damage and disability. From a moral
perspective, then, the argument is strong that an unborn child
can be injured as that term is employed in the harm principle.
But the conclusion that an unborn child deserves protection
under the harm principle does not constitute a sufficient justifi-
cation to criminalize maternal conduct during pregnancy. 4
Four additional factors must be evaluated to reach a conclu-
sion: (1) the seriousness of the harm to be prevented by prose-
cution, (2) the likelihood of harm to the unborn child, (3) the
balance of interests between the mother and her unborn child,
and (4) the social utility of criminal prosecution.
1. Seriousness of Harm Caused by Maternal Substance
Abuse During Pregnancy
The harm principle does not authorize the state to prohibit
every harm, no matter how slight: De minimis non curat lex. 25
The medical literature increasingly reveals, however, that
maternal use of drugs such as cocaine and heroine during preg-
nancy causes serious short- and long-term harm to many chil-
dren. Many "cocaine babies" are significantly smaller in birth
weight, length, and head circumference than infants whose
mothers did not abuse drugs during pregnancy.2 6 Infants
exposed to cocaine during pregnancy are at increased risk of
24. The harm principle standing alone is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient reason to declare harmful conduct criminal. See J. FEINBERG, supra
note 15, at 187. The harm principle is not a necessary condition because
other liberty-limiting principles can be employed to justify criminalization of
certain behaviors. Nor is the harm principle a sufficient condition to declare
harmful conduct criminal because society is not justified in prohibiting all
harms.
25. "The law does not concern itself with trifles."
26. See Bays, supra note 2; Chasnoff, Griffith, MacGregor, Dirkes &
Bums, Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy: Perinatal Outcome, 261 J.
A.M.A. 1741, 1742 (1989); Frank, Zuckerman, Amaro, Aboagye, Bauchner,
Cabral, Fried, Hingson, Kayne, Levenson, Parker, Reece & Vinci, Cocaine Use
During Pregnancy: Prevalence and Correlates, 82 PEDIATRICS 88 (1988);
MacGregor, Keith, Chasnoff, Rosner, Chisum, Shaw & Minoque, Cocaine Use
During Pregnancy: Adverse Perinatal Outcome, 157 AM. J. OBsETRIcs &
GYNECOLOGY 686 (1987); Madden, Payne & Miller, Maternal Cocaine Abuse and
Effect on the Newborn, 77 PEDIATRICS 209 (1986); Oro & Dixon, Perinatal Cocaine
and Methamphetamine Exposure: Maternal and Neonatal Correlates, 111 J.
PEDIATRICS 571 (1987); Zuckerman, Frank, Hingson, Amaro, Levenson,
Kayne, Parker, Vinci, Aboagye, Fried, Cabral, Timperi & Bauchner, Effects of
Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 762
(1989).
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birth defects and neurological impairment. 27 Research on the
long-term consequences of exposure to cocaine in utero is
incomplete, although preliminary results are not encourag-
ing."8 Many toddlers and preschool children demonstrate neu-
rological, motor, and behavioral deficits that bode poorly for
the future. Like "cocaine babies," infants exposed to heroin
during pregnancy are at risk of growth retardation and small
head circumference. Many newborns suffer withdrawal symp-
toms, including tremors, poor sleep and feeding patterns, high-
pitched crying, seizures, and impaired ability to relate to adult
caretakers. Studies on the long-term effects of opiate exposure
during pregnancy reveal that many children are harmed.
"Observed deficits include impaired motor performance and
cognition, poor organization and perception, lack of concentra-
tion, hyperactivity, impulsiveness, aggressiveness, lack of inhi-
bition, and poor visual-motor coordination. 2 9 Children with
impairments related to maternal use of cocaine and heroin dur-
ing pregnancy are prime candidates for educational and social
failure, and eventual difficulty with the law.
2. Likelihood of Harm
Maternal drug use does not affect every unborn child."0
Research discloses, however, that the probability of harm is
sufficiently great to warrant considerable concern."' Pediatri-
cian Jan Bays describes some of the perinatal effects of cocaine:
Cocaine causes a ten fold increased rate of hemor-
rhage or placental abruption, a 23% to 38% rate of spon-
taneous abortions, and increased rates of premature
labor, precipitous delivery, [and] fetal distress..
Cocaine-induced vasospasm may be responsible for the
increased rate of genitourinary, cardiac and central ner-
vous system anomalies reported in these infants ...
Dixon reports that over one-third of cocaine-exposed
neonates had structural abnormalities of the brain on
ultrasound or CAT scan.3 2
27. See authorities listed in Bays, supra note 2.
28. See Bays, supra note 2.
29. Id. at 885.
30. Are Cocaine Babies Doomed to a Lifetime of Failure?, PEDIATRIC NEWS,
Nov. 1990, at 2, col. 3.
31. Id. at 28 ("[slome degree of significant developmental problem was
noted in most of the cocaine-exposed children studied, regardless of whether
their mother used the drug only during the first trimester or throughout
pregnancy ...").
32. Bays, supra note 2, at 883.
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Davis and Fennoy studied the medical records of 70 chil-
dren exposed to cocaine during pregnancy." The children
received a comprehensive medical and developmental assess-
ment. The mean age at time of assessment was slightly above
nineteen months. Ninety-four percent of the children had lan-
guage delay. Nearly sixty-three percent had fine motor delay.
Thirty-seven percent had gross motor delays. Fifty-four per-
cent were delayed in acquiring appropriate social skills. Behav-
ioral abnormalities were seen in fifty-eight percent of the
children, and thirty percent were hyperactive. Eleven percent
of the children met the diagnostic criteria for autism. The
authors write that "[Slignificant neurodevelopmental abnor-
malities and an alarming frequency of autism were seen. The
high rate of autistic disorders previously unreported in chil-
dren exposed to alcohol or opioids alone suggests specific
cocaine effects."' 4
The expanding literature discloses that children exposed
to cocaine and other drugs during pregnancy are at considera-
ble risk of serious harm. With appropriate compensatory pro-
gramming and services, many of these children will overcome
the damage inflicted by maternal drug use. There seems little
doubt, however, that thousands of children will suffer long-
term damage. When the high probability of harm is combined
with the seriousness of the harm, the argument for legal inter-
vention gains ground.
3. Balancing Competing Interests
Before prosecution of mothers can be justified, competing
interests must be identified and balanced. There is no dispute
that maternal drug use during pregnancy poses serious risks
for unborn children. Thus, the interests at stake for the fetus
are weighty. If prosecution holds meaningful promise of
reducing the probability of harm to an unborn child, it seems
the child's wish would be to be spared the ravages of prenatal
exposure to toxic drugs.
Society has an interest in preventing harm to its members,
particularly children, who are incapable of self-protection.
Phillip Johnson observes that "there is a societal interest in
protecting the health of unborn children who will one day be
citizens." 5 Thus, at first blush it seems the interests of society
33. Davis & Fennoy, Growth and Development in Children of Cocaine Abusing
Mothers, 144 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDHOOD 426 (1990).
34. Id.
35. Johnson, supra note 23, at 49.
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align with those of the unborn child. It is important to note,
however, that more than one state interest is at work. In addi-
tion to its stake in child protection, the state has an interest in
preserving the autonomy and privacy of its members, including
pregnant women. In view of the legacy of discrimination
against women, it is particularly important to avoid unwar-
ranted invasion of maternal rights.
Which of these conflicting state interests predominates? If
prosecution of mothers will protect more children than it
harms, the balance of state interests tips toward prosecution.
The harm to be prevented is clear, as is the benefit to individ-
ual children. Although the state has a strong interest in nurtur-
ing privacy and autonomy, this interest is diminished (if not
extinguished) in the context of maternal use of illegal drugs.
The state has already decided that in a contest between auton-
omy and drug use, autonomy loses. The state has no discern-
able interest in protecting a woman's ability to take prohibited
drugs that may harm her unborn child. Thus, assuming again
the positive social utility of prosecution, the state interest in
protecting children predominates over the state interest in pre-
serving maternal autonomy.
What maternal interests are balanced against those of the
unborn child and the state? If criminalization of maternal drug
use is restricted to substances that are prohibited for all adults,
it is difficult to see how any morally defensible interest of the
woman is implicated. There is no moral right to take illegal
drugs. A woman cannot argue credibly that she has a morally
defensible right to endanger her fetus by indulging in illegal
behavior. Thus, it seems that the interests of the child and the
state outweigh the woman's interests. This conclusion, how-
ever, downplays the reality of addiction. To inform a pregnant
addict that her behavior is morally indefensible has the hollow
ring of self-righteous moralizing, and disregards the insatiable,
and in many cases, overpowering craving experienced by many
cocaine and opiate addicts. The power of these drugs over the
addict's will does not excuse the addict's behavior when an
unborn child is likely to be harmed, but the cruel reality of
addiction certainly dampens the enthusiasm to prosecute.
The argument might be made that since a woman has a
legal right to abort her pre-viable fetus, that is, to disregard its
interests altogether by killing it, she necessarily possesses the
lesser right to engage in activity that may harm but not kill. In
response, it should first be noted that this argument has no
application to a viable fetus because abortion is not an option
following viability unless the woman's life or health is at risk.
1991]
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Second, even in the context of a non-viable fetus, the argument
that the abortion right incorporates a right to engage in behav-
ior that could seriously damage the fetus is not persuasive. The
fundamental distinction between abortion and birth should not
be ignored. In the case of abortion, a post-birth child never
comes into being. When a woman decides against abortion,
however, the likelihood is that a child will be born; a child
whose entire life may be marred by drug use during pregnancy.
Neither logic nor morality dictate the conclusion that a right to
prevent all life from occurring includes a right to impair a life
that will exist.
The balancing process outlined above is complex. Rea-
sonable minds can differ on the interests to be weighed and the
ultimate outcome. Nevertheless, grim reality demands that a
balance be struck. Drug affected babies are born every hour.
Because the maternal behavior involved - use of illegal drugs
- is morally indefensible, the balance of interests appears to
tip in the direction of upholding the legitimacy of prosecution
intended to prevent needless harm.
If an attempt is made to punish pregnant women for use of
legal substances that harm the unborn, the balance of interests
shifts. For example, the medical literature establishes that ciga-
rettes and alcohol can harm the unborn. Indeed, alcohol con-
sumption during pregnancy may be the leading cause of mental
retardation in the United States.3 6 As many as one percent of
all infants may be adversely affected by maternal alcohol con-
sumption.3 7 Unlike prosecution for maternal use of illegal
drugs, however, punishing women for smoking or drinking
during pregnancy deprives women of liberty interests enjoyed
by the rest of adult society.
Criminalizing maternal use of legal substances that could
harm the fetus raises the specter of massive government inter-
vention into women's privacy. To avoid this slippery slope, the
dichotomy between legal and illegal drugs offers a workable,
albeit imperfect and not very satisfying, line of demarcation.
Punishing a woman for harm caused by illegal drugs does not
seriously trammel morally defensible interests of the woman.
By contrast, criminalizing legal behavior implicates legitimate
privacy interests and conjures up frightening images of "preg-
nancy police" monitoring every aspect of pregnancy. Smoking,
drinking, and other activities that may harm unborn children
36. Bays, supra note 2, at 882.
37. Id.
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are fit subjects for education and moral suasion, but probably
not prosecution.
When attention is limited to maternal use of illegal drugs
during pregnancy, a morally defensible argument can be made
that in selected cases the "harm principle" justifies criminal
punishment. As I mention several times, however, the linchpin
in this argument is the assumption that prosecution does more
good than harm. Pull out that linchpin and the argument
collapses.
4. The Social Utility of Prosecution
There is reason to believe that the social benefit of prose-
cuting women whose use of illegal drugs during pregnancy
harms their children is outweighed by the social costs of prose-
cution. There is very little, if any, evidence that the threat of
criminal punishment deters pregnant women as a group from
using drugs. Thus, there is no evidence of what might be
called macro-deterrence. There is considerable evidence, how-
ever, that the threat of prosecution will deter women from
obtaining essential prenatal care. 8 The medical literature dis-
closes that even without the threat of prosecution, most women
using illicit drugs receive little or no prenatal care. 9 If prose-
cution becomes commonplace, drug abusing women will soon
realize that it is unsafe to deal with medical professionals
because obtaining prenatal care may involve the police.
38. See Jessup & Roth, Clinical and Legal Perspective on Prenatal Drug and
Alcohol Use: Guidelines for Individual and Community Response, 7 MED. & LAw 377
(1988).
39. See Cherukuri, Minkoff, Feldman, Parekh & Glass, A Cohort Study of
Alkaloidal Cocaine ("Crack") in Pregnancy, 72 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 147
(1988) (in this study "[s]ixty percent of crack-using mothers received no
prenatal care"); Yonekura, Inkelis & Smith-Wallace, Cocaine Intoxication
During Parturition: Maternal and Neonatal Complications (paper presented
at 7th annual meeting of the Society of Perinatal Obstetricians, February 6,
1987). Describing a study at Harbor/UCLA Medical Center, the authors
write that "[w]hereas 93% of non-addicted parturients at our institution have
prenatal care, the majority of parturients with positive toxicology screens
have no prenatal care."
Maternal use of drugs during pregnancy is by no means limited to low-
income women. See National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research
and Education, A First: National Hospital Incidence Survey (1989). Many women
who use illicit drugs during pregnancy are poor, however, and poor women
as a group receive less prenatal care than women who are not poor. See
Cooney, What Determines the Start of Prenatal Care?, 23 MED. CARE 986 (1985);
Miller, Margolis, Schwethelm & Smith, Barriers to Implementation of a Prenatal
Care Program for Low Income Women, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 62 (1989).
1991]
758 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
After speaking with prosecutors who indicate that the
threat of prosecution is a useful tool to coerce some drug abus-
ing pregnant women into treatment, I conclude that individual
women may be deterred by the threat of prosecution - what
might be called micro-deterrence. The question is whether the
benefit of micro-deterrence of a relatively small number of
pregnant women outweighs the risk that large numbers of drug
abusing pregnant women will avoid medical care. Based on
limited present knowledge, the benefits of micro-deterrence
appear to be outweighed by the risks entailed in prosecution.
The ultimate irony of prosecuting maternal drug use during
pregnancy could be that the state harms more children than it
helps.
Focusing prosecutorial attention on women who take
drugs during pregnancy drains limited law enforcement
resources away from the real enemies in the "war on drugs" -
suppliers and pushers. Reducing the supply of illegal drugs
holds greater promise than prosecuting mothers who use them.
Entrusting complex social problems to the legal system is
dangerous because the public may be lulled into a false sense
of security. With the highly visible wheels of the criminal jus-
tice system in motion, the inaccurate impression may emerge
that meaningful steps are underway to deal with maternal drug
use. There is a collective sigh of relief: "Something is finally
being done." Policy makers may escape the responsibility of
grappling with the underlying causes of drug abuse.
Prosecuting women for their conduct during pregnancy
may exacerbate stereotypes of women as less than fully autono-
mous persons. George Annas warns that coercing pregnant
women's behavior through the threat of prosecution treats
women as little more than "fetal containers. '40 Annas writes
that
[alttempts to define fetal neglect, and to establish a pre-
natal police force to protect fetuses from their mothers,
are steps backwards in terms of both women's rights and
fetal protection. Women's rights will only be fostered
when we treat women equally. The best chance the state
has to protect fetuses is through actions to enhance the
41status of all women ....
Dawn Johnson agrees, writing that "[fletal rights laws would
not only infringe on constitutionally protected liberty and pri-
40. Annas, Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
13 (1986).
41. Id. at 14.
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vacy rights of individual women, they would also serve to disad-
vantage women as women by further stigmatizing and
penalizing them on the basis of the very characteristic that his-
torically has been used to perpetuate a system of sex inequal-
ity."42 Although I believe Annas and Johnson exaggerate the
dangers to women's autonomy interests, their warnings are
important.
The desire to come to the aid of unborn children who may
be harmed by maternal substance abuse should be tempered
with a healthy dose of skepticism about the will and ability of
government to restrain itself from unwarranted intervention in
the private lives of citizens. Justice Brandeis once observed
that the tendency of government officials to overstep the limits
of appropriate intervention into private matters often manifests
itself when officials act in the name of beneficence. Brandeis
wrote that "[e]xperience should teach us most to be on our
guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficent.... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding."
The most effective response to the tragedy of maternal
drug use is vastly increased funding for drug treatment pro-
grams and prenatal care, coupled with expanded education
programs to inform women about the dangers of drug use dur-
ing pregnancy.44 Virtually all women want to give birth to
healthy babies. Thus, pregnant women, unborn children, and
society share the same goal. Achievement of this shared objec-
tive is more likely if women are supported rather than prose-
cuted. In the end, the moral high road leads away from
prosecution.
The argument now shifts from moral philosophy to consti-
tutional law. Narrowly tailored statutes authorizing prosecu-
tion for drug use during pregnancy might well survive
42. Johnson, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599,
620 (1986).
43. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
44. See Legal Issues Affecting Drug-Exposed Infants, I IJ. NAT'L CENTER
YouTH LAW (1990); Jessup & Roth, Clinical and Legal Perspectives on Prenatal
Drug and Alcohol Use: Guidelines for Individual and Community Response, 7 MED. &
LAW 377 (1988); American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law,
Drug Exposed Infants and their Families: Coordinating Responses of the
Legal, Medical and Child Protection System (1990).
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constitutional challenge,45 but, again, they are not a viable
solution.
B. An Analysis from Constitutional Law
Constitutional analysis begins with the woman's funda-
mental right of privacy - "the right to be let alone."4 6 The
Supreme Court's privacy decisions deal largely with "matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, and child rearing and education. In these areas, it
has been held that there are limitations on the States' power to
substantively regulate conduct."4 7 The Supreme Court's pro-
creative freedom cases protect a woman's decision to become
pregnant and, within the increasingly uncertain limits of Roe v.
Wade,48 to terminate her pregnancy. The autonomy protected
by these decisions is premised on longstanding respect for pri-
vacy regarding intimate personal matters. As the Court wrote
in Eisenstadt v. Baird,4 9 "[i]f the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."5
It can be argued that prosecuting women for drug use dur-
ing pregnancy affects procreative privacy by forcing women to
choose between prosecution and abortion.5 There is strength
in this argument. It is not difficult to imagine a pregnant, drug
abusing woman saying to herself, "I'd better have an abortion
or I may be prosecuted if my drug use harms my baby." Thus,
prosecution may impact women's procreative privacy by
encouraging abortion. In response, it may be argued that the
possibility that government action may, in some cases, impact
on procreative decision making cannot completely tie the gov-
ernment's hands, and foreclose its ability to respond to a seri-
ous social problem. Furthermore, the act to be prohibited -
illegal drug use - is so far removed from the values protected
by procreative privacy that such conduct does not deserve con-
45. See Maternal Rights, supra note 9.
46. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
47. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Although Eisenstadt was decided on equal
protection grounds, the decision contains a very useful discussion of the right
of privacy regarding procreation.
50. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
51. Moss, supra note 6, at 284.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DURING PREGNANCY
stitutional protection. In sum, I am not persuaded by the argu-
ment that prosecution places an unconstitutional burden on
procreative privacy. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Wis-
consin v. Yoder,52 the state has considerable authority to restrict
parental decision making that "will jeopardize the health or
safety of the child."53
Turning to another important constitutional right, individ-
uals enjoy a right to physical liberty and freedom from
restraint.54 This right may well be implicated by state action
during pregnancy to coerce women to refrain from activity that
harms the fetus. When it comes to prosecution following the
birth of a damaged child, however, the right to freedom from
restraint is not implicated.
Proponents of prosecution draw from an arsenal of state
powers and interests, beginning with the police power, which
authorizes the state "both to prevent its citizens from harming
one another and to promote all aspects of the public wel-
fare."55 Statutes prohibiting child abuse and neglect are based
on the police power, as are laws prohibiting use of drugs like
cocaine and heroin. The police power is supplemented by the
parens patriae authority, under which the state has limited
authority to protect those who cannot protect themselves. As
the Supreme Court stated in Prince v. Massachusetts,56 "the state
as parens patriae . ..has a wide range of power for limiting
parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare." 57 The police and parens patriae powers have direct
and compelling force in the context of child abuse. In New York
v. Ferber,5" the Supreme Court wrote that prevention of child
abuse "constitutes a government objective of surpassing
importance."' 59 Chief Judge Fuld of the New York Court of
Appeals described the state's interest in child welfare as
"transcendent."60
In addition to the police power and the parens patriae
authority, the state has an "important and legitimate interest in
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. Id. at 234.
54. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
55. Special Project, Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the
Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1198-99 (1980).
56. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
57. Id. at 166-67.
58. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
59. Id. at 757.
60. People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y. 311, 312, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334, 258
N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (1965) (FuldJ., concurring).
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protecting the potentiality of human life."' 6 ' In Roe v. Wade the
Court ruled that the interest in potential life exists throughout
pregnancy, grows "in substantiality as the woman approaches
term" 62 and becomes compelling at the point of viability. -In
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,63 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for himself and Justices Kennedy and White, rejected
the concept that the state's interest in the unborn child is less
than compelling prior to viability. The Chief Justice wrote that
"we do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential
human life should come into existence only at the point of via-
bility. . . . '[T]he State's interest, if com2pelling after viability, is
equally compelling before viability.' 7 With the departure
from the Court of Justice Brennan, Roe v. Wade's holding that
the state interest in the unborn becomes compelling only at via-
bility may one day change. At a minimum, the Webster decision
indicates that a majority of the Supreme Court is apparently
willing to tolerate restrictions on abortion that might not have
passed constitutional muster a few years ago. One senses
greater deference for the state interest in the unborn child.
The state has an interest in protecting the general welfare
of children. In Prince v. Massachusetts,65 the Court wrote that
the state's assertion of authority to that end.., is no mere
corporate concern of official authority. It is the interest of
youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth
into free and independent . . . citizens."66 Although the
Supreme Court's decisions are unclear on the point, it is prob-
able that the state interest in the "potentiality of human life"
articulated in Roe v. Wade is the pre-birth equivalent of the state
interest in children described in Prince v. Massachusetts, and not
a separate and additional state interest. Thus, the proponent
of prosecution should not be allowed to tally two state interests
in an effort to strengthen the argument for prosecution. In
reality, only one state interest, the interest in children, is at
work.
In addition to the state interest in protecting children,
born and unborn, the state has an "interest in the protection
61. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
62. Id. at 162-63.
63. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
64. Id. at 3057.
65. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
66. Id. at 165.
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and preservation of human life.... ,67 There is no reason why
this state interest should, not apply to unborn children. The
medical literature discloses that maternal drug use during
pregnancy causes some drug affected fetuses to die in utero.
Thus, the state interest in preserving life can be frustrated by
maternal drug use, and the interest in life dovetails with the
state's interest in child protection to support prosecution.
Does an unborn child have "rights" to consider? Michael
Wald aptly observes that "neither legislatures nor courts have
developed a coherent philosophy or approach when addressing
questions relating to children's rights." 68 It is clear that chil-
dren who are already born possess legal rights. The United
States Supreme Court wrote in In re Gault69 that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."7 And in Bellotti v. Baird,7' the Court stated that "[a]
child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the pro-
tection of the Constitution. ' 72 Yet, in Roe v. Wade the Court
held that an unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 73 Thus, unborn children lack
constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, unborn children are protected by a growing
body of non-Fourteenth Amendment law. 74 The Supreme
Court observed in Webster that "State law has offered protec-
tions to unborn children in tort and probate law .... -75 Tort
law in particular provides considerable protection for the
unborn. The Second Restatement of Torts states that "[o]ne
who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to lia-
bility to the child for the harm if the child is born alive."
76
Since a child-to-be-born bears the scars of a tortfeasor's con-
duct to the same extent as a child injured following birth, it is
appropriate to apply similar rules of civil liability for pre- and
post-natal injury.
67. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990).
68. Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 255, 258 (1979).
69. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
70. Id. at 13.
71. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
72. Id. at 633.
73. 410 U.S. at 158.
74. See Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23
DuQ. L. REV. 1, 4-14 (1984).
75. 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(i) (1977).
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If a third-party tortfeasor is liable for injuries inflicted on a
fetus later born alive, does the same liability extend to the
child's mother? In Grodin v. Grodin 7 the Michigan Court of
Appeals answered in the affirmative, writing that a "child's
mother would bear the same liability for injurious, negligent
conduct [prior to birth] as would a third person." 8 The
Supreme Court of Illinois forcefully rejected the concept of
tort liability for pregnant women in Stallman v. Youngquist,
79
where the court wrote:
It is clear that the recognition of a legal right to
begin life with a sound mind and body on the part of a
fetus which is assertable after birth against its mother
would have serious ramifications for all women and their
families, and for the way in which society views women
and women's reproductive abilities. The recognition of
such a right by a fetus would necessitate the recognition
of a legal duty on the part of the woman who is the
mother; a legal duty, as opposed to a moral duty, to effec-
tuate the best prenatal environment possible. The recog-
nition of such a legal duty would create a new tort: a
cause of action assertable by a fetus, subsequently born
alive, against its mother for the unintentional infliction of
prenatal injuries.
It is the firmly held belief of some that a woman
should subordinate her right to control her life when she
decides to become pregnant or does become pregnant:
anything which might possibly harm the developing fetus
should be prohibited and all things which might posi-
tively affect the developing fetus should be mandated
under penalty of law, be it criminal or civil. Since any-
thing which a pregnant woman does or does not do may
have an impact, either positive or negative, on her devel-
oping fetus, any act or omission on her part could render
her liable to her subsequently born child. While such a
view is consistent with the recognition of a fetus having
rights which are superior to those of its mother, such is
not and cannot be the law of this State.80
There is no denying the power of the Illinois court's rea-
soning. The pervasiveness of the court's argument lies in part
in the specter of pervasive control of women's lives. When
77. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981).
78. 301 N.W.2d at 870.
79. 125 Ill.2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
80. 531 N.E.2d at 359.
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control is limited to maternal use of illegal drugs, however,
concern over privacy is lessened to more tolerable levels, and
the argument for "fetal rights" is more appealing.8 The
unborn child may be said to possess a right to protection from
injury caused by maternal substance abuse. Recognition of
such a right is consistent with the state's interest in the potenti-
ality of human life, and with societal interests in the prevention
of needless harm to others.
The unborn child is completely incapable of protecting its
interest in freedom from damage inflicted by maternal sub-
stance abuse. Therefore, if the unborn child is to be protected,
the responsibility falls to the state. The interests of the fetus
align with the state interest in child protection, adding force to
the argument in favor of prosecution.
This brings us to the balancing process utilized to deter-
mine whether the state may infringe private interests. The
pregnant woman cannot assert a defensible claim to take illegal
drugs. I have already rejected the argument that prosecution
interferes with procreative privacy. Thus, if prosecution is lim-
ited to women who use prohibited substances during preg-
nancy, the woman has very little to place on the scale. By
contrast, the interests of the unborn child and the state weigh
heavily in the balance. When the conflicting interests are bal-
anced, the scale tips decisively toward child protection. Thus, a
defensible argument can be made that prosecution of illegal
drug use during pregnancy passes constitutional muster.8"
Suppose, however, that a woman avoids illegal drugs, and
decides instead to drink to excess. All perfectly legal. As a
result, her baby is born with fetal alcohol syndrome and accom-
panying mental retardation. Does the Constitution tolerate
prosecution in this case? To make the urge for retribution
stronger, suppose the woman knew the risk of drinking because
she gave birth to two other children with fetal alcohol syn-
81. A considerable number of articles discuss the pros and cons of
recognizing "fetal rights." See Trammel, Fetal Rights - A Bibliography, 10 N.
ILL. U.L. REV. 69 (1989).
82. Compare Maternal Rights, supra note 9, at 995, where the author states
that "It]he current constitutional body of privacy law in general, and abortion
law in particular, strongly suggests the existence of a maternal privacy
interest that would be infringed by [criminal] statutes, thus requiring strict
scrutiny by courts" with Robertson, supra note 14, at 442-43, where the
author writes that "[b]ecause there is no fundamental right to use
psychoactive substances, the state would not have to show a compelling
interest in order to restrict their use by pregnant women. A statute
forbidding pregnant women the use of alcohol or tobacco in order to
minimize risks to their fetuses would pass the courts' 'rational basis' test."
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drome. A defensible argument can be made under the police
power for prohibiting certain otherwise legal behavior - such
as drinking - because such behavior by pregnant women car-
ries a known risk of serious harm to unborn children.
In response to the proponent's argument in favor of prose-
cuting certain behaviors that normally are legal, opponents
argue that prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Pregnant women are treated dif-
ferently than all non-pregnant persons. The equal protection
argument is unlikely to succeed, however, in light of the
Supreme Court's apparent tolerance of gender based classifica-
tions that promote important state interests,8 3 and, more par-
ticularly, in view of the Court's holding in Geduldig v. Aiello 84
that classifications on the basis of pregnan'cy are not necessarily
gender based classifications for purposes of equal protection
analysis.
Criminalization of maternal use of certain drugs, particu-
larly illegal drugs, may survive constitutional challenge, but
should probably be avoided for the reasons outlined in the
analysis from moral philosophy. The more effective response
to the problem of maternal drug use is nonpunitive in nature.
If prosecution is ruled out as an acceptable response in nearly
all cases, attention shifts to the authority of the juvenile court
to protect abused and neglected children. The remainder of
this article describes the utility of juvenile court intervention,
with particular attention on reforming the court to reduce the
current emphasis 'on adversarial processes and decision
making.
II. JUVENILE COURT INTERVENTION
There are disadvantages accompanying any form of legal
intervention in the family. Nevertheless, the reality of maternal
substance abuse during pregnancy occasionally necessitates
intervention, and the juvenile court is the appropriate institu-
tion for the task. The positive social utility of juvenile court
intervention, and the benefit for individual children, sometimes
outweigh the invasion of important maternal rights.
Juvenile court intervention can occur at two points:
shortly following birth -to protect newborn children from the
likelihood of neglect in the future, and prior to birth. Although
both types of intervention are controversial, intervention dur-
83. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 714
(2d ed. 1983).
84. 417 U.S. 484 (1981).
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ing pregnancy raises the most serious constitutional and moral
concerns.
A. Intervention Shortly Following Birth
Infants who are born prematurely because of maternal
drug use, infants who demonstrate signs of withdrawal or other
drug related conditions, and newborns whose mothers are
known to seriously abuse drugs, may need specialized medical
care in the hospital. Following release from the hospital, some
drug-affected babies require special care, time, and attention
that drug-abusing parents, particularly addicts, cannot pro-
vide.85 The social science and medical literature support the
conclusion that in some cases it is neither appropriate nor safe
to release newborn babies to the unsupervised custody of sub-
stance abusing parents. Jan Bays describes the risks inherent in
placing newborn children in homes where one or both parents
seriously abuse drugs or alcohol. Bays highlights the degree of
risk in her report:
Chemically dependent families have attributes in
common with families who abuse children. Characteris-
tics of chemically dependent parents and their children
contribute to increase the risk of abuse and neglect.
Parental Risk Factors
Diversion of Resources: To the extent an addicted par-
ent's time and resources are occupied with obtaining and
using drugs, these resources are not available to their
children. Significant amounts of money are diverted to
drugs in an addicted family ....
An addicted parent diverts time from family activities
to efforts seeking, using, being high on and recovering
from drugs ....
As basic a resource as food may be diverted to drugs.
"Some addicts spend their entire monthly allotment of
food stamps on drugs in a day or two, even if it means
letting their children go hungry."
Mental and Physical Illness: Up to 90% of drug abusers
have evidence of other mental, emotional or personality
disorders which can compromise their ability to care for
children ....
Poor Parenting Skills: . . . A University of Utah study
characterizes clear differences in parenting between
85. Bays, supra note 2, at 888-93.
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drug-abusing and non-abusing families. Drug-abusing
families were more socially isolated, less involved in reli-
gious, recreational, social and cultural activities ....
Family life was more chaotic and unpredictable ....
Neglect, including emotional neglect, was common ....
Side Effects of Drugs: Intoxicated adults can become
violent, paranoid, and less constrained about injuring,
molesting or neglecting their children. Most addicts suf-
fer side effects which can interfere with good parenting
or caretaking. Cocaine, methamphetamine, and PCP use
causes anxiety and fearfulness, distrust of others, halluci-
nations, and physical aggressiveness ....
Amphetamine abuse follows a cyclical pattern of
action and reaction. In the action phase the abuser
injects amphetamine one to ten times a day for several
days. Between injections the addict is euphoric, hyperac-
tive and hyperexcitable. In the reaction phase the addict
may sleep 24-48 hours and experience intolerable psy-
chological depression.
Although opiates purportedly have a calming effect,
Black and colleagues found that opiate-addicted parents
reported that they were using heroin at the time they lost
control while disciplining, inflicting marks or serious
bruises. Stress or seemingly minor events can trigger
intense arousal and drug craving, causing parents to
leave their children unattended and begin seeking drugs.
Cocaine users describe cravings triggered by "the sight
of cocaine-using friends or locations, the use of alcohol,
the sight of white bread crumbs on the carpet, and even
the sight of talcum powder while changing a child's dia-
per." A research group studying addicted families in
Los Angeles reports: "Parents who are addicted to drugs
have a primary commitment to chemicals, not to their
children. Disruption and chaos in the household often
result in the neglect or disregard of the child's needs."
86
Dr. Bays provides information on the risks to infants
exposed to drugs and alcohol. "Drug and alcohol-exposed
infants exhibit characteristics which may interfere with parent-
child attachment and place them at greater risk of abuse. Sepa-
ration occurs early after delivery because of medical treatment
for withdrawal, prematurity, intrauterine growth retardation,
or infection."8" Bay describes a report from the Netherlands
86. Id. at 888-89.
87. Id. at 889-90.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DURING PREGNANCY
which characterizes the outcome for very premature or very
low birth weight infants born to addicted mothers as
disastrous.
The infant mortality rate was 50% and the rate of major
handicaps 21%, compared to 30% and 4% for compara-
ble infants born to non-addicted mothers. Most of the
children had been discharged home. The authors write,
"We suggest that serious consideration be given to plac-
ing very preterm and/or very low birth weight children of
addicted parents temporarily or permanently into the
care of the social services and discharging them, not to
the home of the parent(s), but to a foster home." 88
Returning a drug-exposed infant to his parents poses con-
siderable risk. Bays writes:
Although mothers often promise to cease use of
drugs if their infant is discharged home with them, it is
rare for women to stop drug use after delivery. The post-
partum period is in fact a time of increased risk for drug
use. It is frustrating and unrewarding for parents to care
for a baby who is irritable, sleeps less than an hour, who
does not cuddle, does not suck or swallow well, averts its
gaze from its mother's face, and who has a shrill penetrat-
ing cry with difficulty being consoled. Trained nurses
find these infants difficult to care for in 8 hour shifts. A
newborn infant is a stress to any family. If a difficult
infant is given to a mother who is anxious over her ability
to parent, guilty over the harm her addiction has caused
her baby, and who copes with stress by turning to drugs
or alcohol, are problems not to be expected?
Black and Mayer used structured interviews to investigate
the adequacy of child care in 200 families addicted to heroin or
alcohol. "[C]hildren in all of the families with an alcoholic or
opiate addicted parent experience some degree of neglect. ...
When information on abuse and neglect of a child were com-
bined, abuse and/or neglect of a child was found to have
occurred in 41% of the families with an alcohol or opiate
addicted parent."'89
Bays concludes with the following sobering observation:
Child welfare agencies have begun to compile and
publish statistics on child abuse and chemical depen-
dency. Half of all child abuse and neglect cases in New
88. Id. at 890-91.
89. Id.
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York City in 1987 were linked to parental substance
abuse. If alcohol abuse was included, the incidence rose
to 64%. A 1988 review of child fatalities in New York
City revealed that in 25% of cases the child had been
born with a positive toxicology. In over 25% of cases
drug involvement by parents or caretakers contributed
directly to the cause of death.'
No one relishes the thought of intervening in the family or
removing children from their parents. Serious substance abuse
is so destructive, however, that some users simply cannot par-
ent, and when this happens, newborn babies who are already at
risk because of maternal drug use during pregnancy need and
deserve protection.9' This is not to say that all substance abus-
ing parents are incapable of caring for children. Furthermore,
many children of drug abusing parents are cared for adequately
by relatives. When there is evidence of serious substance abuse
or addiction, however, there is cause for concern.
When hospital personnel have reason to believe that a
newborn infant is suffering the effects of maternal drug use,
serious consideration should be given to performing a toxico-
logical drug screen on the infant.9" A growing number of hos-
pitals perform a drug screen when drug use is suspected.93
Normally, the mother's consent should be obtained to perform
the drug screen on the child. Performing the screen without
parental consent raises legal issues, although this hurdle does
not appear to be insurmountable.94 When a baby tests posi-
tive, child protective services (CPS) authorities should be noti-
fied. State child abuse reporting statutes should be amended
to require reporting when children are born with the effects of
90. Id. at 892-94.
91. There is authority supporting juvenile court intervention when a
handicapped child's special needs make it difficult for the child's disabled
parent to care for the child. O.E.E. v. Department for Human Resources, 638
S.W.2d 282 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). The disabling impact of serious drug abuse
and addiction render it impossible for some substance abusing parents to
meet the special needs of their drug affected babies.
92. For an excellent discussion of the issues involved in juvenile court
involvement following birth, including drug testing, see Robin-Vergeer, The
Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 745 (1990).
93. See Moss, Legal Issues: Drug Testing of Postpartum Women and Newborns
as the Basis for Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1406
(1990).
94. See Larsen, Creating Common Goals for Medical, Legal and Child
Protection Communities, in DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES:
COORDINATING RESPONSES OF THE LEGAL, MEDICAL AND CHILD PROTECTION
SYSTEM 3, 4-6 (1990).
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maternal drug use.9 5 When a newborn demonstrates no signs
of maternal substance abuse, but medical professionals have
evidence the mother was using illicit drugs in the days or weeks
prior to delivery, or is an addict, a drug screen should be
administered, and CPS notified if the results are positive. If the
mother is addicted, CPS should become involved even if the
drug screen is negative.
A report to CPS triggers a preliminary investigation to
determine whether it is safe to discharge the newborn baby to
the care of a parent who may be abusing drugs, and who may
not be able to provide for the child. Except in cases of immedi-
ate risk to the child, however, newborn infants should not auto-
matically be removed from the custody of drug abusing
mothers.96 The fact that a woman used illegal drugs during
pregnancy is reason for concern, and in many cases for investi-
gation, but drug use alone should not be equated with parental
unfitness or immediate risk of harm to the infant.97 Most par-
ents who abuse illegal substances love their children dearly,
and many drug abusing parents provide adequately for their
children. As Bonnie Robin-Vergeer cogently points out, the
temptation is strong to label women who use drugs during
pregnancy as selfish and "bad." 98 A punitive response to
maternal drug use does little good, however, and raises the dis-
tinct possibility of overreaction and unwarranted intervention
in competent families. This is not to say that juvenile court
intervention shortly following birth is never appropriate.
When CPS investigation reveals an unsafe environment for the
newborn, intervention is needed.
There is ample legal authority supporting juvenile court
intervention to protect drug affected newborns. In In re Troy
D. , the California Court of Appeals wrote that "prenatal use
95. Several states have amended their reporting law to require
reporting. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-504 (1989
Replacement).
96. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 92.
97. See State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Randall, 96 Or. App. 673, 773 P.2d
1348, 1349 (1989) ("Although we agree with the state that a parent's use of
controlled substances is a proper consideration in determining whether a
child should be made a ward of the state, that allegation is insufficient by
itself to establish that the child's welfare is endangered. The petition must
also include some factual allegation showing how the parent's drug usage
endangers the welfare of the child over whom the court is asserting
jurisdiction.").
98. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 92, at 749.
99. 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1989).
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of dangerous drugs by a mother is probative of future child
neglect." 0 The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed, writing in
Matter of Baby X 10 1 that "prenatal treatment can be considered
probative of a child's neglect.... [A] newborn suffering nar-
cotics withdrawal symptoms as a consequence of prenatal
maternal drug addiction may properly be considered a
neglected child within the jurisdiction of the probate court." 102
In its recent decision in Matter of Stefanel Tyesha C.,' O 3 the Appel-
late Division of the New York Supreme Court ruled that a find-
ing of neglect can be based on maternal drug use during
pregnancy, coupled with evidence that the mother is not
enrolled in drug treatment at the time juvenile court proceed-
ings are instituted. The New York court rejected the argument
that a neglect petition states a cause of action only if it alleges
continued drug use following birth. The Appellate Division
wrote that "a court cannot and should not 'await broken bone
or shattered psyche before extending its protective cloak
around a child .... 104
Although juvenile court intervention shortly following
birth is not free from controversy, the legal issues involved in
postnatal intervention pale in comparison to the legal and
moral questions swirling around juvenile court intervention
during pregnancy to assist or, when all else fails, to force preg-
nant women to stop using drugs. The next section explores
this profoundly difficult issue.
Intervention Prior to Birth
Does the state have power to intervene in the lives of preg-
nant women to forbid behavior that may harm unborn chil-
dren? The thought is frightening, conjuring up images from
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World' °5 and George Orwell's
1984.106
The question of prenatal intervention through the juvenile
court arises in two situations. Quite apart from maternal drug
use during pregnancy, medical professionals occasionally seek
juvenile court authorization to provide medical care to an
unborn child over the objection of the mother. The ability of
medical science to diagnose and treat unborn children is
100. 263 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
101. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
102. 97 Mich. App. at 114, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
103. 157 A.D.2d 322, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1990).
104. 157 A.D.2d at 326, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
105. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
106. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
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expanding rapidly, ° 7 and in rare cases physicians find them-
selves unable to accept a woman's decision to refuse medical
treatment which would be beneficial to her fetus.
Providing medical care to the unborn child necessarily
involves some invasion of the mother's body, thus clearly impli-
cating the woman's rights to physical autonomy and privacy.
The degree of invasion ranges from a one time blood transfu-
sion to major surgery, most commonly Caesarean section to
facilitate delivery.
The majority of commentators object to juvenile court
intervention in medical care cases, arguing that state interests
are not sufficient to outweigh the woman's rights to refuse
medical care and control her own body.' 08 I am among the
small number of writers who support limited intervention
through the juvenile court to provide medical care for unborn
children in some cases. ' 9 The small number of court decisions
split on the permissibility of intervention to provide medical
care prior to birth." 0 By far the most thorough judicial discus-
sion of the issue to date is found in In re A. C. ,11 from the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, which concluded that the
woman's decision must "control in virtually all cases." '"12
When attention shifts from medical care for the fetus to
illegal drug use by the mother, the argument for limited inter-
vention during pregnancy is more persuasive. There is no
doubt that drug use has serious consequences for many unborn
children. The state's interests in the potentiality of human life
and the preservation of life are operational, and are buttressed
by the police and parens patriae powers. To the extent unborn
children enjoy enforceable rights against their mother, these
rights align with the state. A pregnant woman has no moral
claim to take illegal drugs, particularly when such conduct
causes serious harm to some unborn children. Furthermore,
opponents run into difficulty when they argue that intervention
violates women's procreative rights. As discussed in the sec-
107. See Mennuti, Prenatal Diagnosis - Advances Bring New Challenges, 320
NEw ENG. J. MED. 661 (1989).
108. See, e.g., Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAw,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 114 (1989); Nelson, Buggy & Weil, Forced Medical
Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1986); Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The
Emergence of Court-Ordered Caesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1951 (1986).
109. See Myers, supra note 74.
110. Compare In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) with Jefferson v.
Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
111. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
112. Id. at 1249.
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tion on prosecution, illegal drug use during pregnancy is not
sufficiently related to procreative privacy to prohibit interven-
tion. Finally, unlike the medical care cases, forcing pregnant
women to stop using illegal drugs involves no invasion of the
woman's body.
Although a juvenile court order to stop drug use does not
invade a woman's physical autonomy, intervention during
pregnancy has the potential for major infringement of the fun-
damental rights of liberty and freedom of movement. In some
cases, the only way to stop drug use - particularly by addicts
- is to deprive women of their liberty.
Emotions run high when one individual's fundamental civil
liberties are infringed to benefit another, especially when the
one to be benefitted is unborn. Nevertheless, when the poten-
tial harm to children who will be born is considered in light of
the interests of the state and the child, limited juvenile court
intervention to curtail illegal maternal conduct seems morally
and legally justifiable.
If one concedes the legitimacy of limited intervention to
curtail maternal drug abuse during pregnancy, however, it is
immediately apparent that formidable bulwarks must be
erected against unwarranted interference in women's lives.
Professionals who work with abused and neglected children
sometimes lose sight of civil liberties in their zeal to protect
children. Under current legal doctrine articulated in Roe v.
Wade, intervention is probably justifiable only following fetal
viability. Prior to viability, a woman can effectively foil state
efforts to protect her unborn child by exercising her right to an
abortion. 113 Extending the power to intervene prior to viability
may actually encourage abortion, and aborting of an unborn
child the state hopes to protect is certainly counterproductive.
Staying the juvenile court's hand until viability does not ignore
the fact that maternal drug use may do irreparable harm long
before viability. Prohibiting juvenile court intervention until
abortion is no longer an option simply recognizes present law.
It will be time enough to reassess the wisdom of earlier inter-
vention if the Supreme Court alters constitutional doctrine
regarding abortion.
113. Some commentators argue that when a woman decides to carry a
pre-viable fetus to term, the woman waives her right to utilize abortion law as
a means to veto state intervention to protect her pre-viable fetus. This waiver
argument is flawed, as it is difficult to argue persuasively that by deciding to
carry her unborn child to term, a woman has knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived her rights under the Constitution. See Annas, supra note
40, at 14.
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When intervention is a possibility, infringing a pregnant
woman's liberty is defensible only if the danger to the unborn
child is high. Intervention may be appropriate if the state
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that continued
maternal drug use is likely to kill the unborn child. If damage
rather than death is likely to result from continued drug use,
intervention may be permissible on a showing that there is a
high probability that the unborn child will suffer serious harm.
The greater the harm, the greater the justification for
intervention.
Because a pregnant woman's rights to liberty and privacy
are at stake, intervention must be by the least invasive method.
As the Supreme Court remarked in Shelton v. Tucker,"14 even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly sti-
fle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved." 5 Thus, before coercion is justified, a
woman should be afforded meaningful access to voluntary drug
treatment unless it can be established that she is unlikely to
participate in treatment and stop using drugs.
Society's response to the tragedy of maternal drug use
during pregnancy should focus clearly and unequivocally on
education and voluntary services for pregnant substance abus-
ing women. So long as the primary emphasis remains on non-
coercive intervention, the admittedly coercive arm of the
juvenile court can play a useful subsidiary role in protecting
children and assisting women in their effort to stop using
drugs. In my view, however, the juvenile court will not achieve
this important goal unless fundamental changes occur in its
procedure and philosophy.
III. REFORMING THE JUVENILE COURT TO RESPOND MORE
EFFECTIVELY TO MATERNAL DRUG USE DURING
PREGNANCY
Although there is a role for the juvenile court in the
response to maternal drug use during pregnancy, the court will
have to change to fulfill its mission. When substance abusing
pregnant women get an inkling that a visit to the doctor may be
followed by a "visit" to the coercive world of the juvenile court,
many women will be frightened away from the prenatal care
they desperately need." 6 Thus, the court must become less
114. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
115. Id. at 488.
116. Bandstra, Medical Issues for Mothers and Infants Arising from Perinatal
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threatening. At the same time, however, some pregnant
women are so caught in the grip of drugs that the only way to
protect their unborn children is through coercive measures.
Thus, as the court becomes less threatening, it must retain its
authority to override the woman's will. Is there a way out of
this dilemma? I believe so, but only if the juvenile court pur-
sues two seemingly contradictory paths to reform. On the one
hand, the court must become less adversarial so that increasing
numbers of parents view the court as a helping agency rather
than a menace, and so that the number of women avoiding pre-
natal care does not increase. At the same time, however, the
juvenile court must face the fact that many substance abusing
parents do not cooperate voluntarily with court-ordered treat-
ment, and for such parents the court must impose involuntary
treatment. The difficult task is balancing the twin goals of
decreased reliance on adversarial decision making and contin-
ued use of coercive intervention with some parents.
Turning first to the need for a less adversarial approach in
handling parents who abuse drugs, it is useful to trace briefly
the transformation of the juvenile court's jurisdiction over
delinquent children. The social reformers who created the
juvenile court at the turn of the century did not distinguish
between maltreated children and delinquent youth. "' All
"troubled children" were to be brought before the fatherly
juvenile court judge, who would take whatever action was nec-
essary to solve the youngster's problem, whether the problem
was criminal misbehavior or neglect at home. The juvenile
court was envisioned not so much as a court of law, but as a
dispenser of "social medicine," solving problems with compas-
sion and wisdom more than legal doctrine and procedure.
Since, in theory at least, the juvenile court was "treating"
rather than punishing delinquent minors, the formality of pro-
cess and procedure employed in criminal litigation was deemed
unnecessary and, in fact, counterproductive.
Gradually, however, it became apparent that children
accused of delinquent behavior were not receiving the compas-
sionate care envisioned by the founders of the juvenile court,
and a call went out to reform the court so that minors' rights to
Use of Cocaine, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE
LAW, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES: COORDINATING RESPONSES
OF THE LEGAL, MEDICAL AND CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM 21, 22 (1990)
("Adverse effects of cocaine and marijuana usage upon fetal growth and
development may be even more profound in pregnant women who fail to
obtain prenatal care.").
117. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
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fair treatment and due process would be respected. What
some call the constitutional domestication of the juvenile court
began with Kent v. United States... in 1966 and In re Gault,i" 9 a
year later. These landmark decisions, followed by additional
Supreme Court rulings, 2 ° infused delinquency litigation with
principles of due process and adversarial decision making. The
transformation was timely and appropriate. Delinquency cases
always had more in common with criminal litigation than with
the paternalistic intervention envisioned by the creators of the
juvenile court. Today, delinquency trials have assumed most of
the trappings of criminal litigation.
Unfortunately, in my view, the trend toward increasingly
adversarial delinquency litigation generalized to the juvenile
court's jurisdiction over neglected and abused children. 2 '
The informality and nonadversarial nature of dependency pro-
ceedings withered in the name of due process and protection of
parental rights. This is not to gainsay the importance of proce-
dural fairness in dependency cases. Too often, however,
dependency litigation is an all-out war of parent against state,
and opportunities for conciliation, cooperation, and non-
adversarial interaction are squandered.
I believe the juvenile court must go "back to the future" if
it is to achieve its full potential. Back to its roots at the begin-
ning of this century. Back to a time when adversarial decision
making took a back seat to providing services.' 22 The idea of
moving away from reliance on the adversary system is anath-
ema to many lawyers, and it is lawyers, of course, who control
the juvenile court. The commitment of the legal professional
to the adversary system is understandable. The training and
experience of most lawyers equip them for the orchestrated
hostility of trial work, but lawyers as a group are ill-prepared to
understand and participate in the non-adversarial problem-
solving techniques that are employed outside the legal system,
and which I believe hold the greatest promise for weaning the
juvenile court from its growing dependence on litigation.
118. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
119. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
120. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a
reasonable doubt required in delinquency cases); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975) (double jeopardy applies in delinquency litigation).
121. See Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect, JUVENILE JUSTIcE
STANDARDS PROJECT, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (1981).
122. See T. HURLEY, ORIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW (3d
ed. 1907); Fox,Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 23 STAN. L. REV.
1187 (1970); Mack, supra note 117.
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The juvenile court should not be converted into "just
another social welfare agency," and the judge into a social
worker in a black robe. Litigation will remain a key component
of a reformed juvenile court. My proposal is not to take the
"court" out ofjuvenile court, but to shift the emphasis toward
nonadversarial methods of decision making, and to reserve liti-
gation for cases that are not amenable to less formal and, from
the consumer's perspective, less frightening, threatening, and
stigmatizing proceedings.
We need to redirect a portion of the court's resources
away from adversarial decision-making and toward mediation.
Formal mediation should be required in most abuse and
neglect cases. Mediation programs exist in several jurisdic-
tions. Nancy Thoeness, who is.currently conducting research
on such programs, reports that professionals involved with
mediation are generally encouraged. 2 '
Mediation often provides the only opportunity to get all
the professionals involved in a case together in the same room.
Bringing parents, attorneys, and professionals together with a
trained mediator allows negotiation to take place in an environ-
ment that is less formal and adversarial than the courtroom.
Many cases should settle at the mediation stage, without the
necessity for formal and costly litigation.
Moving the juvenile court toward greater informality and
an ethic of cooperation rather than contest is not a panacea.
Drug abusing parents will not flock to the court for assistance.
Nor will a less adversarial approach eliminate the danger that
substance abusing women will shun prenatal care. Neverthe-
less, if the court is to play a constructive role, a more humane
and less adversarial approach is essential. Not only will more
parents find involvement with the court palatable, but medical
and mental health professionals, many of whom are skeptical of
court involvement in families, may find new reason for
optimism.
I do not wish to imply that the juvenile court as it exists
today does more harm than good. On the contrary, the juve-
nile court was a marvelous idea when it was conceived, and it
123. Telephone interview with Nancy Thoeness, Center for Policy
Research, Denver, Colorado (July 3, 1990).
For literature discussing mediation in dependency cases, see Kaminsky &
Cosmano, Mediating Child Welfare Disputes: How to Focus on the Best Interest of the
Child, 7 MEDIATION Q. 229 (1990); Mayer, Mediation in Child Protection Cases:
The Impact of Third Party Intervention on Parental Compliance Attitudes, in
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION, 24 MEDIATION Q.
89-106 (J. Kelly ed. 1989).
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remains so today, nearly a century later. Nor do I wish to deni-
grate from the invaluable service and commitment of the many
fine judges and attorneys serving the court. I firmly believe
that the bench and the bar of the juvenile court perform an
indispensible and positive role in protecting children, assisting
families, and making communities better places to live. My
point is simply that these able professionals could accomplish
much more in a revitalized and reoriented juvenile court.
Paradoxically, just as the juvenile court is traveling the
road toward mediation and a less adversarial approach to fami-
lies, the court itself must be prepared to make an abrupt about-
face and impose highly coercive measures on certain drug
abusing women. Research demonstrates that a high percent-
age of substance abusing parents fail to comply with court-
ordered treatment programs. Richard Famularo and his associ-
ates studied 136 juvenile court cases in which children were
removed from parental custody due to serious maltreat-
ment.124 The research disclosed that "cases involving parental
substance abuse and/or the more severe forms of child mal-
treatment are most resistant to treatment interventions
ordered by the courts .... [C]ourts and social service agencies
cannot rely upon the mere fact of court involvement to yield
effective interventions or compliance with service plans."'1 25
Michael Murphy and his associates examined the prevalence of
substance abuse in a sample of 206 juvenile court cases involv-
ing serious child abuse or neglect, and found a significant
amount of substance abuse. Substance abusing parents were
significantly less likely to comply with court-ordered services
than maltreating parents who did not abuse drugs or alco-
hol. 126 Murphy and his colleagues write:
Our findings indicate that in cases of serious child
mistreatment, parental substance abuse is a pervasive
problem which is associated with higher risk of reinjury,
recidivism, danger to the child, noncompliance with
treatment, and permanent removal of children by the
court ....
The current consensus among mental health clini-
cians is that in cases of serious substance abuse, unless
124. Famularo, Kinscherff, Bunshaft, Spivak & Fenton, Parental
Compliance to Court-Ordered Treatment Interventions in Cases of Child Maltreatment,
13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 507 (1989).
125. Id. at 512.
126. Murphy, Jellinek, Quinn, Smith, Poitrast & Goshko, Substance Abuse
and Serious Child Mistreatment: Prevalence, Risk, and Outcome in a Court Sample, 15
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 197 (1991).
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this problem is identified and treated, there is very little
point in beginning other forms of treatment. Continuing
substance abuse has a high probability of undoing other
interventions.
These observations have a direct bearing on the
question of what the courts should do in these cases ....
Removing [substance abuse] may not solve the problem
of child mistreatment, but not to remove it is to almost
guarantee the failure of other intervention attempts.
Identifying substance-abusing parents, requiring them to
seek treatment, and monitoring and assessing their suc-
cess are necessary first steps in cases with serious sub-
stance abuse.
The current study suggests that parents who fail to
stop using substances are unlikely to change their behav-
iors or to provide safer environments for their
children.'2
7
With the intractable nature of serious drug abuse and
addiction in mind, it is apparent that in many cases, ordering
pregnant women to stop using drugs and participate in drug
treatment is futile. When the risk to an unborn child is high,
and a woman violates a court's order regarding drug use and
treatment, the only effective intervention in some cases is to
hold the woman in contempt and order her to be confined
involuntarily in a hospital or clinic where drugs are unavailable,
and where treatment can be administered against the woman's
will. Involuntary commitment is a drastic step, but it ignores
reality to suggest that less invasive alternatives are available for
some individuals.
In 1989, the Minnesota Legislature came to grips with the
unfortunate need to confine some drug abusing pregnant
women. Under Minnesota law, local welfare agencies may seek
emergency hospitalization of pregnant women who engage in
habitual or excessive use of certain drugs.' 2 8
When the court's attention shifts away from intervention
during pregnancy, and toward drug affected newborns, juve-
nile court judges should make every effort to help parents and
children stay together in functioning families. But again, real-
ity dictates an honest appraisal of the poor prognosis for some
substance abusing parents. In cases of serious drug abuse and
addiction, the most effective approach in some cases is to place
127. Id. at 208-09.
128. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121.883 (West 1989).
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newborn infants in foster care and to move swiftly toward
adoption.
Of course, all the improvement in the world in the juvenile
court will be for naught unless corresponding improvements
are made in the terribly overburdened and underfunded child
protective services system. Progress is equally unlikely without
vastly increased resources for drug treatment and rehabilita-
tion. The juvenile court cannot intervene effectively when the
social services and treatment resources it depends on lie in
tatters.
Can the inescapable need for coercive intervention in
some cases coexist with a less adversarial juvenile court? Or do
the juxtaposition of the words "less adversarial" and "court"
constitute an oxymoron that is as unworkable as it is unrealis-
tic? I do not have the final answer to this puzzle. I believe,
however, that if the juvenile court is to play an effective role in
responding to maternal substance abuse during pregnancy, it is
time to grapple with this conundrum. There is great promise
in reshaping the juvenile court along the lines envisioned
before Gault transformed the court. Needless to say, such a
transformation must be accomplished without shedding princi-
ples of due process and fairness. If work begins today on
rethinking the juvenile court, there is a possibility that at the
dawn of the twenty-first century, society could duplicate the
stroke of brilliance that gave us the juvenile court at the begin-
ning of the twentieth.
CONCLUSION
The legal system has a relatively minor role to play in the
societal response to maternal drug abuse during pregnancy.
Although an argument can be made that women whose drug
use damages children should be prosecuted, the argument in
favor of prosecution is outweighed by the disadvantages of the
punitive approach. Greater hope lies in a rejuvenated juvenile
court-a court that is committed to protecting the due process
rights of parents and children in an atmosphere of cooperation
rather than adversarial decision making. Yet a court that is
willing to take the drastic steps that are sometimes necessary to
protect children and help parents who are caught in the vice
grip of addiction. If the juvenile court can achieve the goals of
compassion in all cases and coercion in some, the court will
fulfill its responsibility to children and parents.
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